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1 Introduction
From the 1950s to the 1970s, China’s rural
healthcare system, the Cooperative Medical
System (CMS), had one of the best records
among all the developing nations in ensuring
that the country’s citizens had access to
sufficient health services for the good health that
is required for development (Rivera, Xu and
Carrin 2006). After the economic reforms,
however, China’s priorities – or at least its ability
to achieve its health goals – changed. Between
the early 1980s and the late 1990s, China’s
health system deteriorated. During this period,
the use of medical care dropped sharply (Bloom
and Gu 1997; Eggleston, Ling, Qingyue et al.
2006), especially in poor rural areas (Akin, Dow,
Lance, Loh et al. 2005). The 2003 National
Survey on Health Services (MOH 2004) reported
that of those who said that they should have been
hospitalised but were not, nearly 80 per cent
lived in rural areas. More than 85 per cent of
those in China’s poorest quintile stated that they
did not seek medical attention because they
could not afford it (Wagstaff et al. 2005).
One reason for this drop in the use of healthcare
in rural areas was the collapse of the CMS.
During the 1970s, more than 90 per cent of
China’s rural residents were covered by it, but
this rate declined after 1980 due to the collapse
of collective economy, inadequate political
attention, bad management and rising medical
costs (Liu and Cao 1992; Zhu 2000; Liu 2004).
Although China’s government attempted to
revive the CMS several times during the 1980s
and 1990s, the coverage of the rural population
by the CMS was only 9.5 per cent in 2003 (Carrin,
Ron, Yang et al. 1999; MOH 2004). The rest of the
rural population had to access healthcare on an
out-of-pocket, fee-for-service basis, making the
problem of medical impoverishment became
more pronounced over time (MOH 1999).
Given rising concerns about the flagging state of
health services in rural China, top officials
decided to initiate a new effort to improve rural
healthcare. Beginning in 2003, the government
launched a new initiative – the New Cooperative
Medical Scheme (NCMS). The overall goal of the
NCMS is to improve the access of rural residents
to health services and – above all – help them to
reduce the risks that accompany catastrophic
illnesses (WHO 2004). The NCMS differs from
the CMS in being run at the county level, with
the central and local governments in theory
bearing the major funding burden. Until the end
of 2007, most provinces had a target of
contributing at least 50 yuan per rural resident
into the NCMS health insurance revenue pool.
Of this amount, in most places, rural residents
were supposed to contribute 10 yuan per person
on a voluntary basis. According to government
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statistics, during the past five years, the NCMS
has expanded dramatically. In fact, by the end of
2008, more than 95 per cent of rural counties
were participating in the scheme (MOH 2009).
In terms of the NCMS’s performance to date,
published studies have focused on three principal
aspects: determinants of farmers’ enrolment in,
and their satisfaction with, the NCMS (Liu, Xu,
Cao et al. 2008; Wang, Gu and Dupre 2008); the
introduction and understanding of the NCMS
policy design (Brown, de Brauw and Du 2009;
Wagstaff et al. 2009a; You and Kobayashi 2009);
and an impact assessment of the NCMS on
farmers’ health seeking behaviour and poverty
reduction (Chen, Xu, Wang et al. 2005; Zhang,
Yan, Rozelle and Wang 2006; Sun, Jackson,
Carmichael and Sleigh 2008; Brown and
Theoharides 2009; Lei and Lin 2009; Wagstaff et
al. 2009a; Yip and Hsiao 2009).
However, efforts to assess the effectiveness of the
NCMS that are both recent and national in scope
have been limited, and the findings indicate that
the programme’s record can at best be described
as mixed. Chen et al. (2005) conclude that the
NCMS played an important role in reducing
poverty caused by ill-health (generating the
findings from data from a survey of 1,080
households in Hubei province in 2005). Zhang et
al. (2006) found (on the basis of a national
representative survey from five provinces) that,
although the participation rate was high in
NCMS-covered villages, the reimbursement rate
was far lower than promised. Using survey data
from a county in Jiangxi province, Yuan, Fang,
Zhou et al. (2006) found that although the NCMS
increased the rate of hospitalisation (or inpatient
care) of rural residents, many respondents
reported that they did not seek medical services
because it was still too expensive. A survey of
8,476 households in 15 counties, collected in
2003 and 2005, Wagstaff et al. (2009a) showed
that the NCMS had increased outpatient and
inpatient service use and reduced the cost of
deliveries, but had not reduced out-of-pocket
expenses per outpatient visit or inpatient stay.
Based on three simulation scenarios, Yip and
Hsiao (2009) concluded that the NCMS could
have only limited effectiveness in protecting the
population from medical impoverishment
because it ignored disease profiles and health
expenditure patterns.
You and Kobayashi (2009) reviewed the papers
on the NCMS published between 1 January 2003
and 30 March 2008, and suggested that rigorous
evaluations, based on richer and more recent
micro-level data, could considerably strengthen
the evidence base for the impact of the NCMS as
it is rolled out to more counties. In this context,
the overall goal of this article is to understand
progress in implementing the NCMS, while
seeking to assess its strengths and weaknesses,
and in particular its effects on the incidence of
catastrophic medical payment.
The article draws on two rounds of nationally
representative household survey data collected in
2005 and 2008.1 The two surveys were conducted
in 100 villages, in 25 counties of five provinces,
and covered a period extending from the second
to the fifth year after the NCMS implementation.
The data used in this article come from modules
for households, villages, village clinics, and the
county NCMS administrative office. The next two
sections introduce some features of the
programme and its progress over time, including
coverage, participation, reimbursement policy
and effect of the NCMS on the medical services
used by rural residents and reduction of
catastrophic medical payment. We then examine
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Table 1 Coverage of the NCMS across rural China, 2004 and 2007
2004 2007
Villages covered by the NCMS in sample 24 100
Total individuals in sample (%) 100 100
Individuals living in villages covered by the NCMS (Covered individuals, %) 24 100
Covered individuals who participated in the NCMS (Participating individuals, %) 79 90
Participating individuals who did so voluntarily (%) 93 98
Data source Authors’ survey.
remaining shortcomings of the NCMS. Finally, we
conclude with a discussion of the implications of
these results for future health policy reform.
2 Features of the programme
2.1 Rapid expansion of coverage
By some criteria, the extension of the NCMS over
the past several years could not have been faster.
Although the piloting started in a few counties in
2003, by the end of 2004, 24 of the 100 sample
villages were covered (Table 1, row 1). Of the
3,141 individuals surveyed in that year, only 783
(or 24 per cent) were living in villages covered by
the programme (henceforth ‘covered
individuals’). By the end of 2007, all the surveyed
villages had been covered. In addition, more than
90 per cent of the individuals in the participating
villages were covered by the programme at the
end of 2007. If the sample villages are nationally
representative, this would mean that at least 90
per cent of the rural population is now
participating in the NCMS programme. This
figure is, in fact, higher than those reported by
the Ministry of Health (MOH 2008). According
to ministerial statistics, by the end of 2007, more
than 85 per cent of rural counties were covered by
the NCMS, and 86 per cent of rural residents
enrolled in the NCMS in covered areas. These
figures, respectively, rose to 95 and 92 per cent by
the end of 2008. When compared to the situation
in the early 2000s, when less than 10 per cent of
the population was covered by a national health
insurance programme, the progress, by any
standard, has been rapid and comprehensive.
2.2 High voluntary participation
Survey data from both rounds demonstrate that
the programme is voluntary and has a high
participation rate. In 2007, 90 per cent of covered
individuals were part of the NCMS, 98 per cent of
them on a voluntary basis2 (Table 1). These are
remarkable successes, possibly due to improved
programme design. In our survey, we asked
individuals who did not participate in the
programme their reasons for not participating.
The pre-coded reasons were divided into two
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Table 2 Reasons reported by sample individuals for not participating in the NCMS in rural China, 2004 and 2007
Stated reasons 2004 2007
Non-participating Share of Non-participating Share of 
individuals (n=160)* total (%) individuals (n=738)* total (%)
Personal reasons 73 45.6 507 68.7
Already covered by alternative insurance 27 16.9 109 14.8
No hukou in village 18 11.2 251 34.0
Do not expect family members to get sick 14 8.8 76 10.3
Infant or newly married 3 1.9 43 5.8
Cannot afford the NCMS premium 11 6.9 28 3.8
Problem with programme design 75 46.9 135 18.3
Working outside of village as migrant or 39 24.4 87 11.8
self-employed
Reimbursement rate too low 10 6.3 10 1.4
Reimbursement procedure too complicated 9 5.6 17 2.3
Believe the NCMS fund management was 9 5.6 21 2.8
not accountable
Price of covered services and medicines 8 5.0 0 0.0
too high
Other reasons† 12 7.5 96 13.0
Notes *Total non-participating individuals is the number of individuals in NCMS-covered villages reporting that they
choose to ‘not participate’.
†The category of ‘Other reasons’ includes three relatively common answers that do not fit into the ‘Personal
reasons’ or the ‘Problem with programme design’ categories: (1) Individual is so sick he/she is not willing to
participate; (2) one of the members of the family is a doctor; (3) individual is too busy and missed the enrolment date.
Data source Authors’ survey.
major categories – for personal reasons and for
reasons that might be interpreted to be
associated with the faulty design of the NCMS
programme (Table 2). In 2004, nearly half (47 per
cent) of the non-covered individuals stated that
problems with programme design were the major
reason why they did not participate. However,
only 18 per cent said this in 2007. For example,
more than 10 per cent of the individuals in the
covered villages did not participate in the NCMS
programme in 2004 because they did not live and
work in the village (that is, they were migrant
workers); only 1 per cent of all individuals in the
sample gave this as their reason for not
participating. Most of those who were not covered
in 2007 (69 per cent) stated that their non-
participation was due to a personal reason.
The existence of family accounts might also
contribute to this high level of voluntary
participation. The fund of family account is part
of a premium paid by participants within a family
and can be directly used to pay outpatient
services by participants and his/her families. As
the NCMS is a community-based programme,
local government has great discretion over
programme design, based on local circumstances.
In our sample, 64 per cent of counties set up
family accounts and promised that the surplus
could be automatically rolled over to the next
year. To some extent, the family account acted as
a savings bank account for medical expenses for
farmers who thus would not lose much even if
they did not get any reimbursement from the
NCMS, especially when the money annually paid
into the family accounts was close to the ceiling
of the premium paid by participant.
The popularity of the NCMS also benefited from
the ‘model effect’ of reimbursement and
aggressive publicity. At first, farmers worried
that the government would not reimburse them
as promised. During our survey, we asked the
village leaders: ‘Of those who suffered from
catastrophic illness (which is judged by village
leader himself) in your village, is there any one
failing to get reimbursed from the NCMS?’. The
data show that in 86 per cent of villages, farmers
who suffered catastrophic illness were
reimbursed by the NCMS without a problem in
2004, and in 2007, this figure was 93 per cent.
The cases where participants were successfully
reimbursed by the NCMS were usually publicised
widely by newspapers, radio and television. The
household data also showed that in 2007, 60 per
cent of households received brochures from the
NCMS administration.
2.3 Revenue collection and reimbursement policy
Although per capita funding supported by both
central government and local governments
increased from 20 yuan in 2004, to 40 yuan in
2007, the premium paid by the NCMS
participants was 10 yuan in all the surveyed
areas, except Jiangsu.3
There are four typical models in the NCMS
reimbursement package: inpatient expenses only
(16 per cent); inpatient expenses and family
accounts for outpatient expenses (36 per cent);
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Table 3 Deductible and nominal reimbursement rates for inpatient care in 25 sampled counties, 2007
Medical expenditure Township health centre County hospital Provincial hospital
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Deductible (yuan) 53 0 200 166 0 500 746 0 2000
0.1–200 48% 0% 70% 17% 0% 60% 7% 0% 35%
200–2,000 54% 30% 70% 44% 26% 60% 29% 0% 42%
2,000–4,000 56% 35% 70% 46% 30% 60% 34% 20% 50%
4,000–10,000 59% 35% 75% 48% 30% 60% 36% 20% 50%
≥10,000 60% 45% 75% 49% 40% 60% 38% 30% 55%
Ceiling (yuan/participant) 24,500 10,000 80,000 Same as in township Same as in township 
health centre health centre
Data source Authors’ data collected from records of county NCMS offices.
inpatient expenses and catastrophic (chronic)
outpatient expenses (20 per cent), and inpatient
expenses and family accounts for outpatient
expenses and catastrophic (chronic) outpatient
expenses (28 per cent). As found by earlier
studies (Wang et al. 2008; Brown et al. 2009;
Wagstaff et al. 2009a), one of the outstanding
features of the NCMS was that inpatient
reimbursement was consistently regarded by all
the NCMS administrative offices as the best
means of providing financial protection to the
insured. This was because amounts in family
accounts were very limited; while reimbursement
for outpatient treatment was available only for
selected chronic diseases and catastrophic
illnesses (which is highly related to local
economic development) and the reimbursement
procedure was very long and hard to be
understood by farmers. The NCMS was also
characteristic in that patients were encouraged to
seek medical services at lower-level health
facilities. As shown in Table 3, the deductibles for
inpatient services at township health centres
were much lower than county and provincial
hospitals, while the nominal reimbursement rates
were higher for the same medical expenditure. In
addition, the nominal reimbursement rate was
supposed to rise with the level of medical
expenditure at the same level health facilities.
3 Effect of the NCMS on rural residents
3.1 Increased use of medical services
While not all the increases in the use of medical
services between 2004 and 2007 was necessarily
due to the NCMS programme, there has been an
observed rise in the use of healthcare services
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Figure 1 Per capita expenditure (yuan) on (A) outpatient and (B) inpatient medical care before reimbursement by
sample households in rural China, 2004 and 2007
Note Average expenditures are calculated conditional on the fact that the individual was ill and sought medical care.
All figures are reported in real yuan (2004 price = 100 yuan).
Data source Authors’ survey.
(A)
(B)
800
600
400
200
0
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Poorest Richest
Poorest Richest
2004 2007
2004 2007
572
656
390
565
3,362
4,796
5,819
7,789
during the period between the two waves of the
survey. In response to the question, ‘Did you seek
medical services when you got sick last year?’,
the share of individuals who responded positively
rose from 90 to 95 per cent. The share of those
who used inpatient medical services rose from
7 per cent in 2004 to 10 per cent in 2007.
The rise in per capita medical expenditures before
reimbursement in real terms also demonstrates
that there is at least some propensity to increase
expenditures on healthcare, for residents of both
the poorest and the richest villages4 (Figure 1).
Outpatients (that is, those who sought
outpatient services) in the poorest areas
increased their expenditure by 15 per cent, from
572 to 656 yuan (A). Expenditures by outpatients
in the richest areas rose from 390 to 565 yuan.
Expenditures on inpatient care also rose (B).
Inpatients in the poorest villages increased their
healthcare expenditures by 43 per cent, from
3,362 to 4,796 yuan, while people residing in the
richest villages increased their expenditures
from 5,819 to 7,789 yuan.
3.2 Increased expected returns to premium
The rise in direct programme payout, especially
relative to the premium that individuals are
paying, provides some evidence that the NCMS
programme is improving. In 2004, the expected
level of reimbursements to individuals was
extremely low. After making a premium payout of
10 yuan, the average covered individual in the
sample received 14 yuan in reimbursements. The
actual payout rate is far lower than the 35 yuan
per individual which is jointly invested by
individuals and the local and central
governments. By 2007, the situation had changed
dramatically. First, the combined investment
from individuals and the local and central
governments rose to 50 yuan, with the share of
the central government’s contribution accounting
for most of the rise. In addition, the expected
reimbursement rose. While the premium was still
10 yuan (for most participants), the average
received back by covered individuals was 47 yuan.
This means that not only was the return on the
10 yuan high (a fact that almost certainly
accounts for the popularity of the NCMS
programme in rural areas and its high rate of
participation), but also that the share of the total
investment used for reimbursements was also
increasing, from 40 per cent in 2004 (14/35) to
94 per cent in 2007 (47/50).
3.3 Improved reimbursement services
Another question in the survey supports the
finding that the current NCMS programme is
running relatively smoothly. In 2004, there were
many complaints about the slow processing of
reimbursements for NCMS-related expenses. In
2007, 87 per cent of the respondents stated that
they had been reimbursed within a week. In
some township health centres and county
hospitals, patients did not need to apply for
reimbursement: the final bill was reduced by the
amount covered by the NCMS. This finding is
consistent with Brown et al. (2009).
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Figure 2 Distribution of participants who received reimbursements, 2007
Note Annual total medical expenditure (yuan), and percentage share of all NCMS-participants who were reimbursed
by the NCMS.
Data source Authors’ survey.
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3.4 Stagnant reimbursement rate
While the preceding evidence suggests that the
NCMS programme initially seems to be doing well
in terms of its reimbursement performance, closer
scrutiny reveals a number of weaknesses, some of
them serious. First, the household data show that
the share of participants reimbursed did not rise
between 2004 and 2007. In 2004, 22 per cent of
the covered participants who sought medical
attention were reimbursed for at least some share
of their expenditures. In 2007, only 21 per cent
were reimbursed (although the drop between
2004 and 2007 is not statistically significant).
3.5 Decreasing reimbursement rate for catastrophic
medical payment
This insignificant change in the share of those
who were reimbursed may have occurred if the
NCMS programme had shifted its emphasis from
reimbursing those who incurred relatively small
medical expenses to those who incurred large
medical expenses. The data, however, do not
support this possible explanation. In fact, in
2007, a large proportion of those who received
reimbursement (36 per cent) incurred expenses
amounting to less than 200 yuan (Figure 2). An
even larger proportion (41 per cent) of all of
those who received reimbursements incurred
expenses ranging between 200 and 2,000 yuan.
In other words, 77 per cent of those who received
reimbursements incurred medical expenses of
less than 2,000 yuan.
The tendency to favour reimbursements for
those who incurred lower levels of expenditure is
borne out by the data in Figure 2, which reveals
the contribution of the NCMS reimbursements
to total health expenditure. Although overall the
real reimbursement rate in 2007 for both
inpatients (15 per cent) and outpatients (4 per
cent) was higher than that in 2004 (i.e. 7 per
cent for inpatients and 3 per cent for
outpatients), the current NCMS programme
does not appear likely to achieve its objective of
helping rural residents in dealing with
catastrophic illnesses.5 As seen in Figure 3, as
one moves from expenditure categories (for
inpatient care) of 200–2,000 yuan; 2,000–4,000
yuan; 4,000–10,000 yuan; and 10,000 yuan and
above, the reimbursement rate falls. Notably, for
those who suffered catastrophic illnesses
(henceforth, the term for all illnesses in which
the inpatient spent more than 4,000 yuan) the
reimbursement rate was 11 per cent for illnesses
costing between 4,000 and 10,000 yuan, and only
8 per cent for illnesses costing above 10,000
yuan, which was clearly not the original purpose
of initiating this programme.
According to the data collected as part of this
study, the problem appears to be that rural
residents are not being reimbursed at the levels
being promised by the NCMS rules. In Table 4,
the real reimbursement rate is compared with the
promised reimbursement rate. It is clear from the
data in Table 4 that patients are not receiving the
amount promised by the programme. Moreover,
the gap widens as the severity of the illness (in
expenditure terms) rises.
Reports of village leaders also suggest that the
real reimbursement rate for inpatients was much
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Figure 3 Real reimbursement rates in sample households in rural China, 2007
Note Real reimbursement rate is equal to the amount that patients were reimbursed from the NCMS over his/her
annual total medical expenditure.
Data source Authors’ survey.
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lower than that promised. Village leaders and
doctors were asked, ‘To your knowledge, how
much did the villager who got the biggest
reimbursement spend on medical services and get
reimbursed from the NCMS?’ The data showed
that the average medical expenditure in 2007 was
32,337 yuan and the real reimbursement rate was
29 per cent, much lower than expected.
3.6 High incidence of catastrophic medical expenses
It is clear from the claims of the respondents
who participated in the NCMS that in terms of
providing funds for covering catastrophic
illnesses, the programme is playing only a minor
role (Figure 4). For example, in the case of
inpatient care for catastrophic illnesses, the
programme contributes only 9.8 per cent. In
order to finance the rest of their medical
expenses, rural households have to draw on their
own savings (62 per cent), borrow from friends
and relatives (16 per cent) and possibly sell off
assets (12 per cent). Thus, while every little
helps, the reimbursements from the NCMS
programme are nowhere near a level where they
provide credible insurance against the risks of
catastrophic illness.
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Table 4 Real reimbursement rates from the NCMS and promised reimbursement rates for inpatients, 2007
Medical expenditure Promised reimbursement rate Real reimbursement rate
0.1–200 40.19 21.79
200–2,000 41.62 25.38
2,000–4,000 43.47 18.22
4,000–10,000 42.89 14.12
≥10,000 40.04 2.18
Notes (1) The promised reimbursement rate is equal to the percentage of reimbursement the inpatient should get
from the NCMS according to published reimbursement rule (not excluding the expenditure for uncovered medical
service) over total medical expenditure. For example, in county A, the deductible for inpatient services is 200 yuan at
a township health centre, and the nominal reimbursement rate for medical expenditure between 200 and 2,000
yuan is 50 per cent. 
One farmer in county A spent 2,000 yuan on inpatient treatment for appendicitis. Some of his medical services
were not covered by the NCMS, which cost him 500 yuan. He was actually reimbursed 650 yuan
((2,000–500–200)×50%/2,000) from the NCMS. Here, the promised reimbursement rate is equal to 45 per cent
((2,000–200)×50%/2000) and the real reimbursement rate was 32.5 per cent (650/2,000).
(2) Only the inpatients who sought medical services once and did not refer between hospitals in 2007 are included
(n=127). 
Data source Authors’ calculations according to the information collected from county NCMS office and household
survey.
Figure 4 Funding sources of individuals who suffered from catastrophic medical payment of >4,000 yuan, 2007
Data source Authors’ survey.
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The descriptive statistics indicate that, although
the incidence of catastrophic medical payment
after reimbursement from the NCMS declined
significantly, the value was very small in 2007
(Table 5).6 Here, the incidence of catastrophic
medical payment is defined as occurring where
annual medical expenditure and out-of-pocket
medical expenditure exceeded a certain share
(100 per cent, 60 per cent, or 40 per cent) of
annual per capita net income at village level.
Obviously, in comparison to the earlier definition
of catastrophic medical payment of 4,000 yuan
(absolute value), this definition will help us take
the regional differences in economic development
into account. The data also suggest that the
incidence of catastrophic medical payment in the
poorest areas was much higher than in the
richest areas before NCMS reimbursement, and
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Table 5 Incidence of catastrophic medical payment at the individual level, by economic development, 2007
Groups Incidence of catastrophic Incidence of catastrophic Incidence of catastrophic 
payment – 100% payment – 60% payment – 40%
Before After (%) Before After (%) Before After (%)
Poorest 8.84 8.39 5.09*** 12.47 12.25 1.76* 17.67 17.28 2.21***
Poorer 11.02 10.62 3.63** 14.93 14.53 2.68** 19.58 19.31 1.38**
Middle 3.94 3.57 9.39** 7.14 6.83 4.34** 9.64 9.33 3.22**
Richer 3.58 3.08 13.97** 6.40 5.96 6.88*** 10.11 9.48 6.23***
Richest 2.48 2.13 14.11** 4.68 4.40 5.98** 6.46 6.05 6.35**
Average 6.05 5.63 6.94*** 9.22 8.89 3.58*** 12.85 12.44 3.19***
Note Column 1 of every block is the incidence of catastrophic medical payment before reimbursement; Column 2 of
every block is the incidence of catastrophic medical payment after deducting the NCMS reimbursement; Column 3 of
every block is the reduction of catastrophic medical payment by the NCMS reimbursement, which is equal to
(Column 1–Column 2)/Column 1×100%.
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Data source Authors’ data collected from the household survey and village leader survey.
Table 6 Scenario analysis under the constraint of total revenue collection for sample population, 2007
Medical Mean Freq. Scenario 1 Scenario 2
expenditure
Reimbursement Reimbursement Reimbursement Reimbursement 
rate (%) (Yuan) rate (%) (Yuan)
0–200 129 11 16 228
200–2,000 1,173 150 16 28,162
2,000–4,000 2,930 102 16 47,818
4,000–10,000 5,943 106 21 132,291 16 100,793
≥10,000 23,820 49 21 245,108 16 186,749
Total 418 377,399 363,749
Deficit 18,649 4,999
Note The total revenue collection for the NCMS programme include premium paid by sample population and
subsidies from local government and central government. The total amount in 2007 equalled 358,750 RMB (=7,175
NCMS participants ×50 yuan per participants).
Data source Authors’ survey.
that this situation did not change even after
reimbursement. Moreover, the reduction of
incidence of catastrophic medical payment by the
NCMS reimbursement in poor areas was much
lower than that in richer areas, that is to say, the
NCMS reimbursement played a more significant
role in the reducing the incidence of catastrophic
medical payments in richer areas.
4 Discussion
Further analysis illustrates that the main problem
is a lack of sufficient programme funds. In order to
demonstrate this, we first total the contributions
from the 7,175 individual participants, 25 local
governments and the central government. The
localities for this sample of individuals would thus
have at their disposal a total revenue pool of
358,750 yuan for insuring all illnesses of the
covered individuals during 2007. As shown in Table
6, this amount falls far short of being able to cover
all the programme’s commitments. If instead of
being used as they were (columns 2 and 3 of Table
6), all the funds were used to reimburse inpatients
with catastrophic illnesses for 21 per cent of their
expenditures (a level that is still only half of what
the programme promises), all the funds would be
(more than) used up (columns 4 and 5). If the cost
of illnesses in all the categories were to be
reimbursed at the same rate, columns 6 and 7 of
the table show that there were only enough funds
to reimburse 16 per cent of inpatient care, even if
nothing were assigned to outpatient care. It is
obvious from these figures that the programme is
severely underfunded, even to meet the promises
currently made by the programme.
5 Implications of recent policy reforms
From our data, we can conclude that China’s
NCMS programme has made tremendous
progress in providing a foundation for a rural
healthcare system. The coverage of villages has
reached 100 per cent. Nearly 90 per cent of rural
individuals are covered by the NCMS. It is
voluntary, the programme design is improving,
and it is clear that this is a popular programme
in China’s rural community.
However, the programme still has a long way to
go if it is to meet its own goal to help rural
residents minimise the financial risks of
catastrophic illnesses. The programme
reimburses rural residents for only a small share
– less than 15 per cent – of their total healthcare
costs. More troubling, the reimbursement rate
falls as the severity of the illness (in expenditure
terms) rises. The effect of the NCMS in reducing
the incidence of catastrophic medical expenses is
very limited. In this area, there also still exist
great gaps between regions.
We have shown in a simple quantitative
accounting exercise that the fundamental
problem is that the programme is underfunded,
lacking the resources to meet its promises. In
March 2009, the Central Committee of the CPC
and the State Council issued a statement,
‘Deepening the Reform of the Medical and
Healthcare System’. The statement highlighted
the health insurance system and the government
promised that it (central and local) would
increase the subsidy further to 120 yuan for each
participant in 2010. However in reality, even if
the funding of the NCMS programme achieved
this increase, it would still not meet the
promised level of reimbursement for
catastrophic illnesses, given the price elasticity of
healthcare expenditures, let alone outpatients.
In addition, although the increase in medical
expenses both in poor and rich areas may
indicate that rural residents have used more
medical services due to the implementation of
the NCMS, our study could not identify how
much of this increase should be attributed to
rises in medical service prices and the purchase
of inefficient medical services. Yip and Hsiao
(2008) has concluded that the primary question
is which agency can be entrusted to act in the
best interests of the people. Otherwise, broader
and deeper health insurance coverage would
translate into a more resource-intensive style of
healthcare (Wagstaff et al. 2009b).
It is clear that the government has tried to keep
patients in lower-level facilities in order to
reduce medical costs and improve efficiency.
However, it can be seen from our study, and from
others, that people cannot get reimbursement
from the NCMS if they seek medical care in non-
NCMS-contracted health facilities (Brown et al.
2009). Why do these people ignore the chance of
reimbursement from the NCMS? One of reasons
is that the quality of medical services provided by
lower level facilities is often poor, especially in
poor areas. To some extent, patients in poorer
areas have to pay more for equal medical
services than those in richer areas, although they
earn less. This is one possible reason for higher
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incidences of catastrophic medical payment in
poorer areas.
If China is to develop a more comprehensive
healthcare system, the current NCMS
programme will have to evolve a long way.
Certainly, part of the problem appears to be that
the county is the unit of governmental
jurisdiction that is ultimately responsible for
covering the liabilities of rural health insurance.
The fundamental concepts of insurance provision
would suggest that there are many flaws in the
current approach. First, most county
governments are themselves in chronic fiscal
deficit. Therefore, most counties will only be able
to cover reimbursements that are equal to or less
than the amount of their revenue pool. This is
part of the reason that their levels of payout are
so low and the NCMS performs worse in poorer
areas in reducing the incidence of catastrophic
medical payment than it does in richer areas.
Counties simply do not have the funds to meet
their programme commitments. Even in counties
with some level of fiscal surplus, it is difficult to
understand how any county should be thought to
have the technical and financial capabilities to
run a complicated health insurance programme.
To conclude, more flexible programmes are
needed if the rural NCMS programme is to meet
its needs, and it is difficult to see how current
funding arrangements will ever enable it to meet
these needs efficiently and comprehensively.
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* We acknowledge the funding of the following
organisations: Social Protection in Asia (SPA)
policy-research and network-building
programme, which is funded by the Ford
Foundation and IDRC and managed by the
IHD New Delhi, India and the Institute of
Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, UK;
Stanford’s Presidential Fund for
Interdisciplinary International Studies; and
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (Science
100).
1 More information on the survey is available
from Yi, Zhang, Singer et al. (2009).
2 In the household survey form, there was a
question: ‘Did you participate in the New
Cooperative Medical Scheme on a voluntary
basis?’, to collect information on farmers’
willingness.
3 Jiangsu is the richest province in our sample.
The funding supported by local governments
and the premium paid by farmers both in
2004 and 2007 were relatively higher than
other provinces.
4 The villages are grouped into five groups by
annual per capita net income in 2003 at the
village levels: poorest, poorer, middle, richer
and richest.
5 Our definition of catastrophic payment here is
4,000 yuan, which is equal to the annual per
capita net income of rural residents in China
in 2007.
6 The multivariate analysis also suggested that
the impact of the NCMS on the incidence of
catastrophic medical payment is very weak,
although detailed results are not reported in
this article because of space limitation.
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